The Metric of Justice – A Comprehensive Analysis of NLRB Case Activity Reports and Administrative Trends (1935–2025)

07
CHAPTER

Introduction: The Administrative Pulse of American Labor

The history of labor relations in the United States is frequently recounted through the dramatic lens of strikes, picket lines, and legislative battles the grand, visible clashes between capital and labor that seize the public imagination. Yet, beneath the tumult of industrial conflict lies a quieter, more persistent narrative recorded in the administrative archives of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). This chapter turns its gaze to the “NLRB Case Activity Reports,” a vast repository of statistical data that serves as the electrocardiogram of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). These reports do not merely catalog bureaucratic output; they quantify the shifting balance of power between workers and employers, the fluctuating capacity of the federal government to enforce industrial democracy, and the evolving strategies of unions in the face of changing economic tides.

For the historian, the policy analyst, and the legal scholar, the Case Activity Reports offer an empirical grounding to the often-anecdotal history of the labor movement. They track the rise of industrial unionism in the post-war era, the precipitous decline of organizing in the neoliberal turn of the 1980s, and the unexpected, volatile resurgence of activity in the post-pandemic years of the early 2020s. Furthermore, these reports illuminate the internal health of the Agency itself its struggles with funding, its battles over staffing, and its vacillating enforcement philosophies as the General Counsel’s office shifts between Democratic and Republican control. The administrative data acts as a mirror, reflecting not just the health of the labor movement, but the health of the administrative state itself.

The period from 2020 to 2025, in particular, represents a distinct epoch in the data, characterized by a “Great Surge” in case intake that collided violently with static agency resources and a judiciary increasingly hostile to administrative deference. This era witnessed a fundamental transformation in the nature of labor metrics. No longer were these reports merely dry recitations of case closures; they became the scorecards of a high-stakes struggle over the very definition of “remedial justice.” The transition from the Biden-era Board, led by General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo who pushed for expansive interpretations of the Act to the post-2024 landscape, marked by the appointment of Acting General Counsel William B. Cowen and a return to “traditional” strictures, provides a stark study in how administrative priorities reshape statistical outcomes.1

This chapter will dissect these trends with exhaustive detail, moving beyond the topline numbers to explore the second-order effects of policy shifts, judicial rulings such as Starbucks v. McKinney and Hiran Management, and the operational realities of the Board’s regional offices. We will examine how a settlement rate of 90 percent serves as a structural necessity rather than a pure efficiency metric, how the “win rate” in union elections paradoxically rises as the number of petitions fluctuates, and how the definition of a “remedy” expanded and contracted in a span of three years. Through a rigorous examination of representation petitions (RC), unfair labor practice charges (C cases), and the contentious realm of Section 10(j) injunctions, this analysis posits that the NLRB’s administrative data reveals a fundamental tension: the agency is caught between a statutory mandate to encourage collective bargaining and a structural incapacity imposed by both Congress and the Courts to fully remedy the violations it documents.

The Architecture of Accountability: Evolution of Reporting Mechanisms

To understand the data, one must first understand the instrument of its dissemination. The manner in which the NLRB reports its activities is not static; it has evolved in response to legislative mandates, technological shifts, and changing philosophies of governance. This evolution has fundamentally altered the granularity and accessibility of labor data, creating both opportunities and blind spots for researchers.

The Era of the Annual Report (1935–2003)

For the first six decades of its existence, the NLRB produced a comprehensive “Annual Report,” a physical tome that detailed every significant decision, statistical trend, and financial expenditure of the fiscal year. These reports were the primary source for labor scholars, providing a consistent longitudinal record of the Agency’s work. In these volumes, one could trace the ebb and flow of the post-war labor accord, the explosion of activity following the Taft-Hartley amendments, and the rise of the service sector economy. The Annual Report was a narrative document as much as a statistical one, offering the Board’s own qualitative assessment of the year’s jurisprudential developments. 

However, the early 21st century brought a shift in administrative philosophy, driven by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and subsequent efficiency mandates. The federal government moved toward a “performance-based” reporting model, which prioritized quantitative metrics over qualitative narrative. Following a 2003 Inspector General report recommending the discontinuation of the traditional Annual Report to save costs and reduce redundancy, the Board migrated its financial and performance data into the “Performance and Accountability Report” (PAR) and its granular case data into online “Case Activity Reports”.3

The "Performance and Accountability" Framework

The transition to the PAR system was more than cosmetic; it reflected a broader trend in federal governance toward “performance metrics” treating the administration of justice as a production line where efficiency (case processing time) often rivaled equity (case outcomes) in importance. The PARs serve a distinct function: justifying the Agency’s budget to Congress. In these reports, the complexity of labor relations is distilled into binary targets “Met” or “Not Met.”

For instance, in Fiscal Year 2024, the Agency reported receiving 24,566 cases, a 9 percent increase over the previous year, yet faced severe limitations in hiring due to budgetary stagnation.5 The PARs reveal a persistent narrative of “doing more with less.” In FY 2023, the Board failed to meet its goal of closing unfair labor practice cases within a specific timeframe, missing the target by 14 percent due to the sheer volume of intake.5 This failure was not a result of inefficiency, but of capacity; the agency’s staffing levels had flatlined while the demand for its services driven by high-profile organizing campaigns at major corporations skyrocketed. This creates a data artifact where “performance” appears to decline precisely when the agency is most relevant to the public, highlighting the flaw in purely quantitative performance metrics for a rights-enforcement agency.

The PAR framework compels the agency to focus on velocity. “Time to disposition” becomes the primary metric of success. While efficient case handling is undoubtedly important for justice, the exclusive focus on speed can obscure the quality of the resolution. A case closed quickly via a weak settlement counts as a “success” in the PAR, whereas a case litigated thoroughly to achieve a landmark precedent might drag down the “timeliness” metrics.

The Shift to Digital Transparency and Interactive Dashboards

The modern Case Activity Reports, now largely accessible through interactive dashboards and Power BI visualizations, offer real-time transparency but arguably fragment the narrative continuity of the older Annual Reports. Researchers must now piece together the agency’s story from disjointed datasets: “Intake,” “Disposition,” “Remedies,” and “Litigation”.6

This move to online reporting has democratized access to data, allowing for granular analysis of specific regions and industries. Users can now isolate “RC” (Representation) petitions from “RD” (Decertification) petitions with a few clicks, revealing micro-trends that were previously buried in aggregate tables.7 For example, the ability to separate “RM” (Employer-filed) petitions allows for a specific analysis of employer aggression in the post-Cemex era, a nuance that might have been lost in older, aggregated tables.

However, this transparency is double-edged. The immediacy of the data often lacks the contextual analysis that the General Counsel’s summary operations previously provided. Consequently, the burden of interpretation has shifted to external analysts organizations like the Hamilton Project, the Economic Policy Institute, and Brookings who mine this administrative data to construct the narrative of labor’s health.7 These external bodies perform the interpretive labor that the agency itself has largely abandoned in its public-facing documents, creating a decentralized ecosystem of labor statistics.

The Pulse of Labor Relations: Case Intake Dynamics (2014–2025)

The most fundamental metric of the NLRB is “intake” the raw number of charges and petitions filed by the public. This number serves as a proxy for the level of conflict and activity in the American workplace. Historically, intake peaked in the mid-20th century and saw a long, slow decline mirroring the drop in union density. However, the data from 2020 to 2025 indicates a sharp reversal of this trend, a phenomenon widely termed the “Great Surge.” This surge was not merely a statistical blip; it represented a structural shift in the American workforce’s engagement with collective bargaining statutes.

The Representation (R Case) Renaissance

Representation cases, specifically RC petitions filed by employees seeking unionization, are the clearest indicator of worker desire for collective bargaining. After hitting a nadir in 2021 with only 1,269 petitions a historic low driven by the logistical and economic paralysis of the COVID-19 pandemic RC filings exploded in the subsequent years.

The following table illustrates the dramatic volatility of this period:

Table 7.1: NLRB Representation (RC) Petitions Filed (FY 2016–2025)

Fiscal Year Petitions Filed (RC) Year-over-Year Change Contextual Factors & Drivers
2016 2,029 – Late Obama Board; stable organizing environment.
2017 1,854 -8.6% Onset of Trump Administration; regulatory uncertainty.
2018 1,597 -13.8% Continued decline; focus on deregulation.
2019 1,673 +4.7% Slight rebound amidst tight labor market.
2020 1,440 -13.9% COVID-19 Pandemic onset; lockdowns freeze organizing.
2021 1,269 -11.9% Pandemic nadir; lowest intake in decades.
2022 2,072 +63.3% The “Great Surge” begins; Starbucks/Amazon campaigns.
2023 2,115 +2.1% Continued momentum; “essential worker” narrative.
2024 2,371 +12.1% Peak of surge; high public approval of unions.
2025 (Est) 2,100 -11.4% Cooling effect; political transition and legal headwinds.

Source: Derived from NLRB Case Activity Reports and Representation Intake Data.10

The data reveals a startling “V-shaped” recovery. The 63.3% jump in 2022 is unprecedented in modern records. This surge was driven not by traditional manufacturing sectors, but by service industries coffee shops, warehouses, universities, and cultural institutions. The filing of over 2,300 petitions in 2024 marked a return to levels not seen since the mid-2010s.5 This was a worker-led phenomenon; the petitions originated from the shop floor, often independent of large international unions initially, as seen in the grassroots nature of the Amazon Labor Union and Starbucks Workers United movements.

However, the estimated data for 2025 suggests a cooling, with intake dropping back to 2,100 petitions.10 This decline correlates with the political transition and the shifting legal landscape discussed later in this chapter. It suggests that while worker interest remains high, the mechanism of the Board election may be becoming less attractive or more difficult to navigate due to new friction points introduced by changing Board membership and employer countermeasures. The “surge” may have plateaued, transitioning into a phase of entrenched conflict rather than exponential growth.

Decertification (RD) and Employer (RM) Petitions

While RC petitions measure union growth, RD and RM petitions measure union fragility and employer aggression.

Decertification (RD): These petitions, filed by employees to remove a union, generally track inversely with economic security. Interestingly, RD petitions remained relatively stable during the surge, fluctuating between 300 and 400 annually.10 For instance, in 2024, there were 406 RD petitions, a modest number compared to the thousands of RC petitions. This stability contradicts the narrative that the 2022-2024 period was purely one of union growth; it indicates that established bargaining units remained contested terrain. The stability of RD petitions suggests that while new workers were organizing, existing union members were not fleeing representation in significant numbers, despite the economic turbulence of inflation.

Employer Petitions (RM): These petitions are filed when an employer questions a union’s majority status or when a union demands recognition. Historically, RM petitions are rare. However, the data shows a massive spike in activity related to employer petitions in 2024. The reports indicate 87 RM petitions were dismissed and 115 withdrawn in 2024, compared to negligible numbers in prior years.13

This anomaly is critical. It likely reflects a strategic shift by employers utilizing the framework established in the Cemex decision (before its potential rollback). Cemex incentivized employers to file RM petitions if they refused to recognize a union based on card check. The spike in RM filings is therefore a direct administrative artifact of a doctrinal change a “Cemex bump.” It demonstrates how Board case law directly manipulates statistical intake. As the legal environment shifts again under a new General Counsel in late 2025, we can expect RM filings to either plummet (if Cemex is overturned) or mutate into a different strategic tool for delay.

The Paradox of Win Rates

Perhaps the most striking insight from the 2020-2025 data is the divergence between union density and union win rates. While the overall percentage of private-sector workers represented by unions continued to hover around historic lows (approximately 6-7% in the private sector, 10-11% overall) 14, the success rate of unions in elections that did occur reached multi-decade highs.

In FY 2024, unions won approximately 74% of elections.15 By mid-2025, Bloomberg Law analysis reported a win rate of 81%, the highest ever recorded.16 This creates a paradox: unions are filing for fewer elections than in the 1970s or 1990s, but they are winning them with overwhelming consistency.

Table 7.2: Union Election Win Rates (Selected Years)

Year Win Rate (%) Analysis & Implications
1997 51% Contentious, balanced outcomes; traditional industrial organizing.
2009 66% Recession-era consolidation; flight to security.
2021 54% Pandemic lows; difficult organizing environment.
2022 70% The “Great Surge” begins; high motivation among essential workers.
2024 74% High public approval of unions (Gallup highs).
2025 81% Selection bias; unions only file “sure wins” amidst legal uncertainty.

Source: NLRB and Bloomberg Law Data.16

This trend suggests a qualitative shift in organizing strategy. Unions, lacking the resources to blitz entire industries and fearing the high cost of failure, are engaging in “micro-targeting” organizing smaller, distinct units where victory is mathematically assured before the petition is even filed. The high win rate is a metric of efficiency, but also of caution; it reflects a movement that cannot afford to lose. It also implies that the “unorganized” workforce is not monolithic; there are pockets of intense pro-union sentiment (e.g., baristas, grad students, medical residents) that skew the win rates upward, masking the difficulty of organizing the broader industrial or clerical workforce.

The Enforcement Engine: Unfair Labor Practice (C Case) Activity

If representation cases are the heart of the NLRB pumping new life into the labor movement Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) cases are its muscle. These cases, designated as “C” cases, allege violations of the Act, such as firing workers for organizing (Section 8(a)(3)), surveilling employees (Section 8(a)(1)), or refusing to bargain in good faith (Section 8(a)(5)). The volume and disposition of these cases determine the actual rule of law in the American workplace.

The Intake Tsunami

Parallel to the rise in election petitions, ULP charges surged, creating a bottleneck in the agency’s enforcement pipeline. In FY 2023, the agency received 19,869 ULP charges. By FY 2024, this number climbed to 21,300.2 This 10% year-over-year increase placed immense pressure on the Field Offices, which were operating with staffing levels significantly lower than in previous decades.

The nature of these charges often mirrored the specific tactics of the “Great Surge.” A significant portion of the intake involved allegations of retaliatory discharge and “failure to bargain” in newly organized units. The “first contract” crisis became a statistical reality: workers would win an election (R case) and immediately file a charge (C case) alleging the employer was stalling negotiations. This intersection of R and C cases creates a complex administrative burden; the agency must litigate the ULP to validate the election results, extending the timeline for resolution by years.

The "Settlement Culture" and the 90% Imperative

With intake rising and staffing stagnant, the NLRB relies heavily on settlements to clear its docket. The Case Activity Reports consistently highlight a settlement rate of over 90% for meritorious cases.19 This is not merely a statistic; it is an operational doctrine. The agency simply does not have the judicial capacity (Administrative Law Judges) or the prosecutorial resources to litigate every violation.

The data reveals a subtle but critical fluctuation in settlement rates that correlates with General Counsel policy:

    • FY 2019 Settlement Rate: 99.3%.20
    • FY 2024 Settlement Rate: 96.3% of meritorious cases.2

The decline from 99.3% to 96.3% is statistically small but operationally significant. It reflects the aggressive posture of General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo (2021–2025), who sought “full remedies” rather than easy compromises. Under her guidance, Regional Directors were instructed to reject settlements that did not provide comprehensive relief, including consequential damages (discussed in Section 7.5). This insistence on higher standards inevitably led to fewer settlements, as employers preferred to litigate rather than agree to expansive liability.

However, the landscape shifted dramatically in late 2025 with the appointment of Acting General Counsel William Cowen. As evidenced by Memo GC 25-06, Cowen rescinded the Abruzzo-era requirements for “full remedial relief,” explicitly prioritizing “efficiency” and “prompt resolution” over “remedial enthusiasm”.2 This policy pivot is expected to drive settlement rates back toward the 99% mark in the FY 2026 data.

Table 7.3: The Calculus of Settlement (Policy Comparison)

Policy Era GC Philosophy Settlement Target Impact on Data & Justice
Abruzzo (2021-2025) “Full Remedy” Quality > Speed Lower settlement rate (96%); Higher backlog; Higher monetary recovery per head; greater deterrence.
Cowen (Late 2025-) “Efficient Resolution” Speed > Quality Higher settlement rate (proj. 99%); Lower backlog; Reduced non-monetary remedies; focus on docket clearing.
Source: Analysis of GC Memos and Settlement Data.2

This shift effectively trades the depth of justice for the speed of disposal. A 99% settlement rate clears the desk, but if the settlements are merely “slaps on the wrist” (e.g., posting a notice rather than paying damages), the deterrent effect of the NLRA is diminished. The administrative data thus captures a cyclical vacillation between rigorous enforcement and bureaucratic efficiency.

The Remedial Battlefield: Damages, Reinstatement, and the Thryv Doctrine

The most contentious data points in the Case Activity Reports of the mid-2020s revolve around “Remedies Achieved.” For nearly 90 years, NLRB remedies were limited to “equitable relief” primarily backpay (wages lost) and reinstatement. The Board did not impose fines, penalties, or compensatory damages for pain and suffering. This limitation was often cited as a key weakness of the Act; it was essentially “cost-free” for an employer to violate the law if the only penalty was paying wages they would have paid anyway.

This changed with the Board’s 2022 decision in Thryv, Inc., which expanded remedies to include “direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms.” This meant employers could be liable for credit card debt, medical bills, moving expenses, or investment penalties incurred by a worker due to an unlawful firing.

Video 1:

Quantifying Thryv

Following Thryv, the monetary recovery figures in the reports began to change, reflecting this expanded definition of “make-whole” relief.

    • FY 2023 Recovery: $56.9 million.24
    • FY 2024 Recovery: $56.5 million.24
    • FY 2025 (Projected): $64.0 million.24

While these numbers are substantial, they were achieved under a legal cloud. The Thryv doctrine faced immediate and withering scrutiny from the federal judiciary and the employer defense bar, who argued it transformed the NLRB into a tort court without a jury.

The Judicial Counter-Reformation: Hiran and Starbucks

In late 2025, the federal courts struck back. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits issued twin rulings that severely curtailed the Board’s remedial ambitions, rendering much of the Thryv-era data an anomaly rather than a new baseline.

    • Hiran Management v. NLRB (5th Cir., Oct 2025): The case involved a karaoke restaurant, “Hungry Like the Wolf,” where eight employees were fired for organizing. The Board ordered the employer to pay for “foreseeable pecuniary harms.” The Fifth Circuit vacated this order, holding that the NLRB lacks the statutory authority to award compensatory damages, explicitly rejecting the Thryv standard as a “draconian” overreach.25 The court emphasized that the NLRA allows only for “affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay,” not broad tort-like damages.
    • NLRB v. Starbucks (6th Cir., Nov 2025): Similarly, the Sixth Circuit vacated a Board order requiring Starbucks to compensate a fired organizer (Hannah Whitbeck) for consequential damages. The court reinforced the traditional limit to equitable relief, arguing that the Board had exceeded its congressional mandate.27

These decisions effectively bifurcate the data: the “Thryv Period” (2022–2025) will likely stand in the historical record as a brief window of expanded remedial data, followed by a forced return to traditional backpay metrics in FY 2026 and beyond. The $64 million recovered in 2025 may represent a high-water mark that will not be repeated under the stricter judicial interpretation.

Reinstatement Offers: The Hollow Victory?

Reinstatement the return of a fired worker to their job is the gold standard of NLRA enforcement. It is the only remedy that truly restores the status quo and demonstrates to other workers that the law protects them. However, the data shows a troubling trend.

    • FY 2021: ~980 offers.
    • FY 2022: ~1,430 offers.
    • FY 2023: ~1,720 offers.
    • FY 2024: ~1,650 offers.29

While offers increased during the surge, the raw numbers remain low relative to the 21,000+ ULP charges filed. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence and legal analysis suggest that the acceptance rate of these offers is low. Workers who have been fired often move on to other jobs or fear returning to a hostile workplace. The administrative data tracks the offer of reinstatement, but rarely captures the acceptance rate, leaving a gap in our understanding of effective restorative justice. If 1,650 offers are made, but only 200 workers return, the union’s strength in that shop remains decimated.

The "Nip in the Bud" Doctrine: Section 10(j) Injunctions

Section 10(j) of the Act authorizes the Board to seek temporary injunctions in federal district court to stop unfair labor practices while the administrative case proceeds. This is the Agency’s “emergency brake.” Given that administrative litigation can take years, a 10(j) injunction is often the only way to save an organizing drive from being crushed by illegal firings before an election can even be held. Under General Counsel Abruzzo, 10(j) activity was prioritized as a strategic tool to prevent “irreparable harm”.30

The Strategy of Aggression

The data reflects this priority, though perhaps not in the way one might expect. The raw number of authorized injunctions did not explode, but the targeting became more aggressive.

    • FY 2022: 20 authorized injunctions.
    • FY 2023: 16 authorized injunctions.
    • FY 2024: 13 authorized injunctions.32

While the number of authorizations seems low, the profile of the targets was high major corporations like Starbucks, Amazon, and large healthcare systems were frequent subjects. The goal was deterrence: to show that the Board would not wait for the slow administrative process to play out.

The Supreme Court Intervention: Starbucks v. McKinney (2024)

The strategic use of 10(j) faced an existential threat in June 2024, when the Supreme Court ruled in Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney.33 Historically, many courts applied a lenient “reasonable cause” standard to Board injunction requests, deferring to the agency’s expertise. In McKinney, the Supreme Court rejected this standard, imposing the stricter four-part Winter test used for traditional preliminary injunctions.

Under Winter, the Board must prove:

    1. Likelihood of success on the merits.
    2. Likelihood of irreparable harm.
    3. Balance of equities tips in its favor.
    4. Public interest.

This ruling had an immediate impact on the data.

    • Post-McKinney Activity: In late 2024 and 2025, the number of “Seeking Injunction” statuses in the reports begins to stall or result in withdrawals.32 The Board, realizing it could not meet the higher evidentiary burden in certain cases, chose to withdraw petitions rather than face dismissal.
    • Win Rates: The historical success rate for 10(j) litigation was 74.1%.35 Post-2024 data, however, shows a divergence, with district courts denying injunctions that would have previously been granted.

The McKinney decision effectively raised the price of admission for injunctive relief. As a result, the FY 2025 data shows a cautious Agency. This represents a “data shadow” the cases that weren’t filed because the legal bar was moved too high. The decline in 10(j) numbers in 2025 is not a sign of fewer violations, but of a restricted remedial pathway.

Institutional Capacity and the "Doomed to Succeed" Narrative

https://www.pbs.org/video/labor-at-the-court-1713909831/

A critical reading of the Case Activity Reports must account for the agency’s resources. The NLRB has been flat-funded for much of the 2010s and 2020s, resulting in a staffing crisis. Real-dollar funding declined significantly, forcing a reduction in Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs) in the Field Offices.

    • Staffing vs. Intake: Between FY 2014 and FY 2024, field staff declined significantly (via attrition and hiring freezes) while case intake rose by nearly 50% in the latter half of that decade.5
    • Processing Time: Despite these headwinds, the agency often met its “timeliness” goals. In FY 2024, the median age of pending cases was 106 days, well below the 180-day target.5

This data point success amidst starvation is often used by fiscal conservatives to argue that the Agency does not need more money. “If they can meet their targets with current funding, why increase it?” acts as the prevailing logic. However, a deeper look at the “withdrawals” and “settlements” data suggests that speed is often achieved by triaging cases more aggressively.

The high settlement rates discussed in Section 7.4 may be a symptom of an agency that cannot afford to litigate. When a Regional Director knows they have only a handful of attorneys to try cases, they are structurally incentivized to accept settlements that are “good enough” rather than “fully remedial.” The statistical success of the NLRB in processing cases thus masks the degradation of the quality of justice provided to the workers. The agency is “doomed to succeed” on paper, even as its actual power to enforce the Act erodes.

Future Outlook: The Pivot of 2025 and Beyond

As the dataset moves into late 2025, the numbers begin to reflect the political transition. The appointment of Acting General Counsel William Cowen and the impending confirmation of new Board members signal a return to “traditional” labor law enforcement.

The immediate impacts visible in the early FY 2026 data include:

    1. Drop in Consequential Damages: With Hiran and Starbucks as binding precedent in key circuits, and Cowen’s rescission of Abruzzo’s memos, the “Monetary Remedies” line item will likely contract to backpay-only levels. The era of the “comprehensive remedy” is over for the foreseeable future.
    2. Decline in 10(j) Activity: The combination of McKinney and a less aggressive GC will likely reduce 10(j) filings to single digits. The Board will reserve this tool for only the most egregious and legally certain cases.
    3. Rise in Settlement Rates: The emphasis on “efficiency” will likely push settlement rates back toward 99%. This will clear the backlog but may reduce the deterrent effect of ULP charges.
    4. Cooling of Intake: As unions perceive the Board becoming less friendly, they may file fewer ULP charges, preferring to resolve disputes through arbitration or economic action (strikes) rather than Board processes.

Conclusion

The NLRB Case Activity Reports are a testament to the resilience of the American worker and the fragility of the administrative state. The data from 2014 to 2025 tells the story of a labor movement that woke up filing petitions at rates not seen in a generation and winning elections with historic frequency. Yet, the same data reveals a legal infrastructure straining to contain this energy.

The “Great Surge” of the early 2020s met the “Judicial Wall” of the mid-2020s. The statistical record of this collision found in the surge of RC petitions, the spike in 10(j) litigation, and the subsequent decline in remedial breadth offers the clearest view of the structural limits of the NLRA. The agency proved capable of documenting the unrest, but ultimately incapable of fully remedying it in the face of judicial and legislative constraints.

As we look to the future, the Case Activity Reports will remain the essential chronicle of this ongoing struggle. They remind us that labor law is not static; it is a living system, breathing through the intake of charges and exhaling through the disposition of cases. Whether that breath becomes a gale of change or a dying gasp depends not just on the workers filing the petitions, but on the political and legal structures that count them.

References

    1. The Bargaining Table Blog, ‘Go Forth and Settle’: NLRB Acting General Counsel Relaxes Standards for ULP Settlement Remedies, 2025. 23
    2. NLRB, Performance and Accountability Report FY 2024, 2024. 5
    3. NLRB, Historical Reports: Annual Reports, 2025. 4
    4. NLRB, NLRB Case Activity Reports, 2025. 36
    5. NLRB, Performance and Accountability Report FY 2024, 2024. 5
    6. NLRB, Case Activity Reports, 2025. 36
    7. The Hamilton Project, Tracking National Labor Relations Board Actions, 2025. 9
    8. John-Paul Ferguson, NLRB Representation Case Data, 2025. 37
    9. Brookings Institution, Tracking National Labor Relations Board actions through its administrative data, 2025. 7
    10. NLRB, Representation Petitions – RC, 2025. 10
    11. NLRB, Representation Petitions – RC Intake, 2025. 10
    12. NLRB, Decertification Petitions – RD, 2025. 12
    13. NLRB, Employer-Filed Petitions – RM, 2025. 13
    14. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members — 2024, 2025. 38
    15. National Association of Letter Carriers, Union Elections, 2024. 15
    16. Bloomberg Law, Union organizing activity is showing signs of slowing down, 2025. 16
    17. Bloomberg Law, Labor Unions Initiated More Strikes in 2023, 2024. 39
    18. Bloomberg Law, Labors Triumphant Organizing Year May Not Be Its Last, 2023. 40
    19. NLRB, Facilitate Settlements, 2025. 19
    20. The Bargaining Table Blog, Acting General Counsel Relaxes Standards, 2025. 23
    21. Littler, NLRB Acting GC Memorandum Aims at Early Identification of Section 10(j), 2025. 1
    22. McAfee & Taft, New NLRB Guidance Emphasizes Need for Prompt and Fair Settlements, 2025. 2
    23. The Bargaining Table Blog, Acting General Counsel Relaxes Standards, 2025. 23
    24. NLRB, Monetary Remedies Achieved, 2025. 24
    25. United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Hiran Management v. NLRB, 2025. 25
    26. Employment Law Worldview, Federal Circuit Courts Split on NLRB’s Expanded Remedies, 2025. 27
    27. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, NLRB v. Starbucks Corp., 2025. 28
    28. Employment Law Worldview, Federal Circuit Courts Split on NLRB’s Expanded Remedies, 2025. 27
    29. NLRB, Reinstatement Offers, 2025. 29
    30. NLRB, General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo Releases Memorandum on Importance of 10(j), 2021. 30
    31. NLRB, NLRB General Counsel Issues Memo on New 10(j) Injunction Casehandling, 2024. 41
    32. NLRB, 10(j) Injunctions, 2025. 32
    33. Supreme Court of the United States, Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 2024. 34
    34. Harvard Law Review, Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney ex rel. NLRB, 2024. 33
    35. NLRB, Section 10(j) Injunctions – Litigation Success Rate Report, 2025. 35

Data Appendix: Key Statistical Tables

Table 7.4: Total Unfair Labor Practice (C Case) Intake (2016–2025)

Fiscal Year Total C Cases Trend
2016 21,326 Baseline (Obama era)
2017 19,280 Decline
2018 18,871 Decline
2019 18,552 Decline
2020 15,869 Pandemic Low
2021 15,081 Historic Low
2022 17,998 Recovery Begins
2023 19,869 Acceleration
2024 21,300 The Surge
2025 (Est) 19,754 Stabilization/Cooling

Source: NLRB Annual Case Intake Data. 10

Table 7.5: 10(j) Injunction Activity Overview (2014–2024)

Metric Statistic Source
Total Cases Litigated (2012-2024) 135 35
Overall Success Rate 74.1% 35
Authorized (FY 2022) 20 32
Authorized (FY 2024) 13 32
Post-McKinney Status High Withdrawal Rate 32

Note: Success rate is historical average; post-2024 win rates are trending lower due to the new Supreme Court standard.